Kenai Peninsula Report
By Selectman Weil

The following is also posted on the Town site  under the Selectman as a Word document.

Report on Information Visit to

Kenai Peninsula, Alaska

Re: ConocoPhillips/Marathon LNG Terminal at Nikiski

 

Gordon L. Weil

Selectman, Town of Harpswell

October 30, 2003

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

On October 22 and 23, 2003, I visited the Kenai area in Alaska to gather information on the impact of the ConocoPhillips/Marathon LNG facility at Nikiski and local views on the performance of the facility and its operators in the community.

With the assistance of the Kenai Peninsula Borough (a borough is roughly equivalent to a strong county government), I met with a cross-section of interested and affected parties, who provided me with a considerable amount of information. In addition, I visited the LNG facility. I explained the question before the Town of Harpswell. In all cases, people responded directly to all questions I raised.

As a result of these interviews and visits, listed in Appendix A to report, I gathered useful information for the consideration of Harpswell people. The text of the report contains only information obtained from Kenai sources, except where I have placed text in brackets [ ]. In addition, I make some recommendations for further consideration. Where I draw conclusions, I note that they are limited to the matters addressed and should not be considered an endorsement of the proposal before the Town, as there are other matters, beyond those addressed in this report, that should also be taken into account. In addition, my visit was relatively brief which limited the degree of detailed investigation.

I express my appreciation to Bill Popp, who deals with oil and gas matters for the Kenai Peninsula Borough and who formerly was chair of the Borough legislative body, who arranged most interviews and Jed Watkins, the chief engineer at the LNG facility.

THE FACILITY AND THE KENAI AREA

The LNG facility receives natural gas from drilling locations in and around the Cook Inlet and converts it to LNG for transport to Tokyo where it is used under long-term purchase arrangements. As an LNG delivery point, the facility uses far more extensive processing and equipment than is used at a receiving terminal, as is proposed for Harpswell. Thus, noise, security and risk are somewhat higher than they would be at a receiving terminal. The facility is not state-of-the-art in some respects, but the operators believe that a sound maintenance program has enabled them to have satisfactory operations over the years.

The ConocoPhillips facility was operated by Phillips before the merger of the two companies. Marathon has a 30% minority interest in the terminal and the ships; ConocoPhillips operates the ships and Marathon operates the vessels. The site is smaller than the Harpswell Fuel Depot property and is owned by the plant operators. Estimated coverage is about 50 acres with a jetty of about 1,100 feet. It is located adjacent to a fertilizer manufacturing facility and close to a refinery and a gas-to-liquids operation. The nearest residences, of which there are only a few, are at least one-half mile distant from it.

The facility includes three tanks, all of which are smaller than the tanks that would be placed at the Harpswell Fuel Depot. LNG in storage tanks is not held under high pressure.

The facility is located in the unincorporated town of Nikiski, situated immediately north of the City of Kenai and within the jurisdiction of the Kenai Peninsula Borough. The Borough includes several special taxing districts, which allows a number of areas to levy property taxes for designated purposes within a district. In Nikiski, for example, supplementary taxes are levied for recreation, fire protection and senior citizen services, all of which are distinct from taxes raised in other areas and cities within the Borough.

The facility was constructed in 18 months, entered into service in June 1969 and has operated continuously since then. It is subject to regulation by the State of Alaska and to arrangements resulting from 9/11 requirements. Financial requirements governing the removal of the facility, which may occur in a few years, are set by the state government. No bond is required in Alaska. Harpswell was advised to impose its own removal and restoration requirements

Although not directly related to LNG, the Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council, established by federal law "to prevent oil spills" and achieve "an environmentally sound Cook Inlet" was suggested as a possible model for Casco Bay matters. The CIRCAC consists of 13 members, seven from municipalities and boroughs and representatives of aquaculture, commercial fishing, native, environmental, recreational and commercial interests.

 

SECURITY ON-SITE

Security is provided at the facility under contract with an outside company. When a vessel is not at the jetty, one guard is on site. When the vessel is at the jetty, two guards are on site. The security contingent consists of four full-time and five part-time positions. Four security personnel are on duty at all times with two additional persons assigned when a vessel is at the jetty. The security system uses motion detection, including fiber optics in the wire fence [identical to the fence at the Harpswell Fuel Depot] surrounding the facility, and a roving patrol. All personnel were formerly engaged in public law enforcement.

The site is illuminated from high poles with lighting covering wide areas. Halogen, sodium and mercury lights are used. Given its industrial location, the facility makes no special effort to reduce lighting impacts on its neighbors. However, security could be satisfactorily maintained by use of smaller, more focused fixtures.

Because of the use of its own security personnel, the facility places no requirements on local law enforcement agencies. It has access to the CAN system, which is similar to enhanced 911, and allows multiple persons to be phoned simultaneously in case any community warning is required.

There have been no security incidents at the facility. Several years ago, Greenpeace staged a demonstration at the adjacent fertilizer plant, but there was no effect on the LNG facility.

 

SECURITY FOR SHIPS

Ships require approximately 19 days for the roundtrip to Japan, so that an arrival occurs each 9-10 days with the ship remaining in port for about 25 hours. There have been more than 1,000 successful transits. Each vessel is 239 meters or 784 feet in length and draws 11 meters or 36 feet. No dredging has been required.

The ships are owned by ConocoPhillips/Marathon (and operated by Marathon) and are relatively new, as has been required by the Japanese authorities. The companiesí retired vessels have been placed in service elsewhere.

Tanker vessels are not accompanied by either tugboats or Coast Guard vessels. They arrive and depart in line with tide conditions. Tidal swings of 40 feet are not unusual. Almost all arrivals and departures occur in daylight hours. There is a 1,000 yard exclusion zone, but registered fishing boats are allowed within this zone. Enforcement relies on reports by the tanker masters and by other fishing vessels. The Coast Guard indicates that a higher level of enforcement would be used if national threat levels are increased. The Coast Guard points out such zones do not now apply to oil tankers, which are characteristically more dangerous. It is possible that the enforcement provisions relating to LNG vessels may be discontinued at some future date. The Coast Guard regulation implementing 9/11 protection is contained in Appendix B to this report.

Because the same two tankers are used, the masters are known to the other vessels, and they are familiar with the local waters. The same two pilots, based in Homer, Alaska, are used. Pilots must be provided by pilotsí associations in the area; there are only three in Alaska. Because all participants are known to one another, security is enhanced.

Previously, the tanker schedules were public knowledge. Currently, the distribution of such information is limited, but may be made available to fishermen. Some tankers announce their presence on channels 10, 13 and 16 at specific waypoints in the approaches to Cook Inlet, allowing drift netters, who require as much as two hours to collect their gear, ample time to leave the channel. The LNG tankers do not necessarily adhere to this practice, but they may be asked to do so.

When the vessel is at the jetty, the tension in the mooring lines is electronically monitored continuously so that ice buildup can be determined and relieved as necessary to prevent the vessel breaking loose. The interconnection between the vessel and the terminal itself is not capable of automatic interruption, although such technology is now available.

 

IMPACT ON FISHING

Several kinds of fishing take place in the Cook Inlet. Set netters operate close to shore, including behind the vessel mooring area at the jetty. Drift netters operate in the Inlet, using 900 foot nets. Netters have seasons of about two months. Halibut fishing takes place during a 10-month season and involves fishing from lines with multiple hooks along the Inlet bottom at some distance from the terminal, but where it can be affected by passing vessels. There is also cod fishing.

Fishermen are organized in associations that represent their interests. They report that there has been some gear loss, most of which has been covered by compensation within 30 days. When gear loss is caused by a passing vessel, the fisherman may contact the tankerís master immediately by radio to announce the loss. Where claims cannot be readily substantiated, they may not be paid. The fishermen would like a standard rate for types of losses to be established. While halibut fishermen have not been compensated for gear loss, drift netters suggest that there are few incidents during their season, with claims amounting to about $15,000. One vessel was capsized due to the action of one shipper (not LNG), and the owner was fully compensated.

Fishermen engage in emergency training for which they may be compensated at about $5,000 a year. They become first responders in case of any oil spills. They are the best means of detecting unfamiliar vessels in local waters and can inform the Coast Guard of the presence of such vessels. Kenai fishermen suggested that Harpswell fishermen could also become involved in evacuation planning if necessary (see below).

The local fishermen attempt to work cooperatively with the various shipping facilities, because of local political circumstances. They seek the support of the general public in their competitive battles with strong sport fishing interests. When comparing his own experience with fishing in Harpswell, one fisherman suggested: "They (local fishermen) are in the community. They should be willing to make a bit of a sacrifice for the community."

 

FIRE: INCIDENTS AND PROTECTION

During its existence, no fires have been reported at the Kenai LNG facility.

In the event of a fire at the facility, it would rely on monitors (unmanned fire fighting nozzles) on site and the Nikiski Fire Department. Station 1 of that Department is located about a mile away. The Fire Department would (1) extinguish fires in conventional structures such as the office building, (2) rescue endangered personnel probably by using foam and (3) prevent the spread of the fire by establishing water curtains and by wetting and cooling adjacent structures. The last activity would be carried out automatically without fire fighters having to remain near the fire after the protection was established.

In case of a major LNG leak that came in contact with an ignition source, a large fire would result. Any harmful thermal effects should be contained within the property limits of the facility. To reduce the length of the fireís duration, fuel would be transferred out of the affected tank into other tanks. In the case of Harpswell, the liquid would be gasified as rapidly as possible and shipped out via the pipeline. Otherwise, the fire would be allowed to burn itself out, which might require several days. If such a situation arose, Harpswell Neck Road would be closed to traffic past the facility for from six to 24 hours. A road closure would require that any persons having to travel beyond the Fuel Depot (including school children returning home) would need to be transported on the water either to landings on Harpswell Neck or to Orrís or Bailey Island. Such a transfer could be accomplished by local boats with trained personnel. No evacuation would be required.

The Kenai LNG facility has conducted testing with respect to vapor cloud formation and ignition. A cloud forms from an LNG spill, but is no higher than the width of the spill. Because the gas dissipates quickly, fires are limited and are not sustained and essentially extinguish themselves.

The Nikiski Fire Department has received LNG training by faculty members of Texas A&M University who have come to the area at the expense of Conoco/Phillips. The Department consists of 25 full-time fire fighters and 13 volunteers (plus 10 volunteers located elsewhere on Cook Inlet). It has become a full-time department thanks to the elevated tax revenues Nikiski has received from the industrial facilities in its district. It has never been called out for a fire at the LNG facility, but trains there annually. It does not find that the LNG facility would require a full-time department and suggests that revenues that Harpswell might receive from the proposed facility be used for obtaining the best available equipment. In addition, it suggests that all Harpswell companies receive LNG training. On site, it suggests that a large water storage tank should be required.

 

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

The Kenai LNG facility, a liquefaction facility, is not comparable with a receiving terminal relative to its environmental impact. It is now under increased state supervision as are all oil and gas facilities in Alaska in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster.

Environmental interests report that ConocoPhillips is "environmentally responsible", the "best on the block" and "one of the better and more communicative companies."

They advise that Harpswell should insure that the proposed facility should maintain the highest standards with respect to provisions of the Clean Water Act and prevent the use of mixing zones under the erroneous principle that "dilution is the solution to pollution." This concern relates to the discharge of process waters, which may not arise at the proposed facility. In addition, rigorous enforcement of Section 112R of the Clean Air Act is recommended; it provides for Risk Management Plans for worst case scenarios. Finally, it was recommended that Harpswell prevent discharges of ballast water that might contain foreign species. At the Kenai facility, ballast water is discharged, but that would not be the case in Harpswell. Based on good knowledge of Maine environmental law, it was recommended that air and water operations at Harpswell be required to meet state standards.

The largest potential sources of environmental impact will be visual and sound. Once again, the Kenai facility is not comparable with the proposed Harpswell facility. All power on site is purchased from the local utility; there is a 300HP standby unit available. No attempt is made to screen the facility from view or to reduce light impacts, because the facility is located in an industrial area. In the night sky, the facility (and its neighbors) affects views of the sky, but mostly only when a person looks in the direction of the facility.

ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY EFFECTS

Under Alaska state law, all oil and gas facilities pay property taxes at a rate of $20 per $1,000 of valuation [Harpswell is now $9.40]. Then, the state pays the local tax rate and retains any surplus. Local taxes are lower than this rate in the Kenai region, but the mechanism provides an incentive for local taxing districts to increase spending, because so much of the necessary taxes will be paid by oil and gas interests. The result is that Nikiski provides services, for example for recreation and senior citizens, which far exceed those in other communities. With respect to the LNG facility, the Kenai governments or taxing districts are not required to provide a significant level of services. Even with four industrial operations in Nikiski, the facilities do not impose a significant burden of the single road serving them.

There are disputes between the taxing authorities and the facilities over their valuation, less likely to be a matter of concern where all payments exceed property taxes as is proposed for Harpswell.

The facility employs 42 full-time and 10 contract staff. The contracted personnel include the security staff, electrician and laborers.

The impact on the local economy was not available, but it was suggested that it might be about $35 million or more annually. Annual payroll is about $4 million [Harpswell is estimated to be $3.3 million]. One oil services supplier alone bills ConocoPhillips about $6 million annually, including for services elsewhere on Cook Inlet. Its spokesman suggests that, if Harpswell approves the facility, local people should form their own services company to get work that might otherwise go to out-of-state companies. The construction phase could provide significant revenues for the Maine economy.

Many sources commented on the positive contribution of ConocoPhillips to funding and staffing local non-profit organizations.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The information visit yielded several ideas that may merit being pursued by the Town in its negotiations with ConocoPhillips and TransCanada, by the companies themselves or by other interested parties. The following points were not provided by people interviewed.

1. Continuing efforts should be made to reduce the cumbersome marine security measures suggested for Harpswell, but not used at Kenai. The Coast Guard detachment commander in Kenai should be put in contact with the Portland Captain of the Port. Boston is not a good model.

2. Fishermen should be included in any emergency planning activities and be compensated for their participation and training.

3. Water supply. The water tower should be made available for use by the facility. It will not be adequate in itself, but it could supplement a new water tank. Water from the usable Fuel Depot well should be made available for routine uses; there is no reason for this well to remain idle for 50 years. Initial and make-up water could be transported to the site by barge or truck. A desalination plant might not be necessary.

4. Power supply. The onsite generation would be used to supply normal requirements and for backup. In such case, some generators would be operating at all times, constituting the largest source of noise. Power could be supplied by cable from the Wyman units at Cousins Island with backup generation onsite. In that case, there would be reduced generator operation and related noise.

5. Lighting. The project should provide detailed information on area lights and screening, which could reduce light leakage off-site.

6. Ships. Just as the Japanese have required up-to-date vessels to be used, and the companies have used the same two vessels at Kenai, the same principles should apply at Harpswell.

7. Environment. Maine law should apply when any provision is stricter than federal law.

 

PERSONAL NOTE

I have not taken a position on the proposed LNG facility for Harpswell. Throughout my interviews, I asked all relevant questions that I thought would be of interest to Harpswell people and tried to obtain information objectively. Obviously, some people were favorable to the Kenai facility, while others had a more armís-length attitude. I recognize that many of the elements of this report may appear favorable to the proposal, but not all are. This result does not reflect any personal bias nor is this report intended to constitute a recommendation on how either the Selectmen or the Town Meeting should vote, especially because, in my view, we continue to lack sufficient information to make a decision. I have included in Appendix A a list of the people with whom I spoke and, on request, I will put interested Harpswell people in touch with any of them who are available.

 

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEWS

 

Dale Bagley Mayor and Borough Administrator, Kenai Peninsula Borough

Mike Chenault Representative, Alaska House of Representatives (and Sue Wright, a member of his staff)

Gary L. Fandrei Executive Director, Cook Inlet Aquaculture Association

Steve Howell Director of Public Outreach, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council

Warren P. Isham Assistant Chief, Nikiski Fire Department

Brent Johnson Setnetter

Jeff Koehler Supervisor, Security, Kenai LNG (contract personnel)

Roland R. Maw Executive Director, United Cook Inlet Drift Association; fisherman

Fred A. Miller President, Nikiski Chamber of Commerce; engineer (I held question and answer session with Chamber members at their meeting.)

Michael Munger Executive Director, Cook Inlet Regional Citizens Advisory Council; formerly with Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation

Lt. Mark McManus Supervisor, USCG, Marine Safety Detachment Kenai

Mike Peek Homeowner, Nikiski

Tom Pellegrom Cook Inlet Area Manager, Peak Oilfield Service Co.

Bill Popp Oil and Gas Liaison, Kenai Peninsula Borough; former chair of Borough Assembly

Bob Shavelson Executive Director, Cook Inlet Keeper; interned at Natural Resources Council of Maine

R.J. "Jed" Watkins Staff Facility Engineer, Cook Inlet Area, LNG Operations

John J. Williams Mayor, City of Kenai; former professor of petroleum technology

 

 

APPENDIX B: U.S. COAST GUARD REGULATION FOR COOK INLET

4910-15-U

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Coast Guard

33 CFR Part 165

[COTP Western Alaska 02-001]

RIN 2115-AA97

Security zone; Liquefied Natural Gas Tankers, Cook Inlet, AK

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard adopts, as final, the interim rule published in July 2002 that established security zones for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) tankers in Cook Inlet, AK, within the Western Alaska Marine Inspection Zone and Captain of the Port Zone. This final rule includes an effective information collection requirement calling for vessel and crew information from the owners or operators of commercial fishing vessels desiring to fish within the security zone.

DATES: On September 4, 2002, OMB approved the collection of information required by 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii) as published on July 1, 2002.. This final rule is effective [Insert date 30 days after date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER.].

ADDRESSES: Comments and material received from the public, as well as documents indicated in this preamble as being available in the docket, are part of docket (COTP Western Alaska 02-001) and are available for inspection or copying at Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Anchorage, AK between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lieutenant Mark McManus, USCG Marine Safety Detachment Kenai, at (907) 283-3292 or Lieutenant Commander Chris Woodley, USCG Marine Safety Office Anchorage, at (907) 271-6700.

 

 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

 

Regulatory Information

On July 1, 2002 we published an interim rule with requests for comments entitled "Security Zone, Liquefied Natural Gas Tankers, Cook Inlet, AK" in the Federal Register (67 FR 44057). We received no comments. No public hearing was requested, and none was held.

Background and Purpose

In its July 2002 interim rule, the Coast Guard established 1000-yard security zones around LNG tankers to safeguard the tankers, Nikiski marine terminals, the community of Nikiski, and the maritime community from sabotage or subversive acts and incidents of a similar nature. Paragraph 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii) of that interim rule was not made effective because the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved the collection of information called for by that paragraph. On September 4, 2002, OMB approved the collection of information. We are therefore adopting the interim rule as final and we are making paragraph 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii) effective.

You can find more detailed background information in the preamble of the interim rule (67 FR 44057) under SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

Regulatory Evaluation

This rule is not a "significant regulatory action" under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12886, Regulatory Planning and Review, and does not require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that Order. The Office of Management and Budget has not reviewed it under that Order. It is not "significant" under the regulatory policies and procedures of the Department of Transportation (DOT) (44 FR 11040, February 26, 1979). We expect the economic impact of this rule to be so minimal that a full Regulatory Evaluation under paragraph 10(e) of the regulatory policies and procedures of DOT is unnecessary. This finding is based on the minimal time that vessels will be restricted from the zone, that vessels may still transit through the waters of Cook Inlet and dock at other Nikiski marine terminals.

Small Entities

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), we have considered whether this rule would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The term "small entities" comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000.

The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This rule will affect the following entities, some of which may be small entities: the owners or operators of vessels intending to transit or anchor in the vicinity of the Phillips Petroleum LNG Pier during the time this zone is activated; and the owners or operators of fishing vessels operating their nets in the vicinity of the Phillips Petroleum LNG Pier during the months of July through August.

These security zones will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities for the following reasons. Marine traffic will still be able to transit through Cook Inlet during the zonesí activation. Additionally, vessels with cargo to load or unload from other Nikiski marine terminals in the vicinity of the zone will not be precluded from mooring at or getting underway from the terminals. The owners of fishing vessels that typically fish in the vicinity of the LNG pier during the summer months will not be prohibited from operating if they notify and provide information to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment in Kenai before fishing in the security zone. The Coast Guard will collect information from them that is essential to keeping the pier secure from sabotage or subversive activities.

Collection of Information

The Captain of the Port, Western Alaska requires information on fishing vessel owners and operators, and their vessels and crew, desiring to fish in the security zone around the Phillips Petroleum LNG Pier. This information is required to ensure port and vessel safety and security, to ensure uninterrupted fishing industry openings, to control vessel traffic, develop contingency plans, and enforce regulations. This collection of information is controlled by the Office of Management and Budget under the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control no. 2115-0540.

Recently, security zones were established for LNG tankers in Cook Inlet, AK through an interim rule published in the Federal Register on July 1, 2002 (67 FR 44057). A copy is available in the docket [COTP Western Alaska 02-001] under ADDRESSES or electronically through a web site at http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/.

. It became effective on July 6, 2002, with the exception of one paragraph, 33 CFR 165.1709(b)(1)(ii), which contains collection of information requirements. This rule modified an existing collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

Because this section required the collection of information, it could not become effective until it was reviewed and approved by the OMB. As required by 44 U.S.C. 3507(d), we submitted a copy of this interim rule to OMB for its review. On September 4, 2002, after reviewing the rule and the overall collection of information burden under control no. 2115-0540, OMB approved the collection of information required by this interim rule.

Federalism

A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on State or local governments and would either preempt State law or impose a substantial direct cost of compliance on them. We have analyzed this rule under that Order and have determined that it does not have implications for federalism.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 or more in any one year. Though this rule will not result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule elsewhere in this preamble.

Taking of Private Property

This rule will not effect a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications under Executive Order 12630, Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights.

Civil Justice Reform

This rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize litigation, eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

Protection of Children

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks. This rule is not an economically significant rule and does not create an environmental risk to health or risk to safety that may disproportionately affect children.

Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments

This rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

Energy Effects

We have analyzed this final rule under Executive Order 13211, Actions Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use. We have determined that it is not a "significant energy action" under that order because it is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866 and is not likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. It has not been designated by the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy action. Therefore, it does not require a Statement of Energy Effects under Executive Order 13211.

Environment

We considered the environmental impact of this rule and concluded that under figure 2-1, paragraph 34(g), of Commandant Instruction M16475.1D, this rule is categorically excluded from further environmental documentation. This rule fits paragraph 34(g) as it establishes a security zone. A "Categorical Exclusion Determination" is available in the docket for inspection or copying where indicated under ADDRESSES.

Subjects in 33 CFR Part 165 Harbors, Marine safety, Navigation (water), Reporting and Record keeping requirements, Security measures, Waterways.

PART 165--REGULATED NAVIGATION AREAS AND LIMITED ACCESS AREAS

Accordingly, the interim rule amending 33 CFR part 165 that was published at 67 FR 44059 on July 1, 2002, is adopted as a final rule without change.

Dated: February 2626, 2003 .

 

H. Mark Hamilton

Commander, U. S. Coast Guard

Alternate Acting Captain of the Port, Western Alaska